Domains, brains, and evolution. by Wheeler,  M. & Atkinson,  A.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
10 March 2015
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Wheeler, M. and Atkinson, A. (2001) 'Domains, brains, and evolution.', in Naturalism, evolution and mind.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 239-266. Royal Institute of Philosophy supplement. (49).
Further information on publisher's website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511563843.012
Publisher's copyright statement:
c© Cambridge University Press 2001
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
 1 
Domains, Brains and Evolution 
 
Michael Wheeler1 and Anthony Atkinson2 
 
1Department of Philosophy, 
University of Dundee, 
Dundee, DD1 4HN, UK 
Email: mwwheeler@philos.dundee.ac.uk 
 
 
2Psychology Department, 
King Alfred’s College, Winchester, 
SO22 4NR, UK 
Email: A.Atkinson@wkac.ac.uk 
http://www.wkac.ac.uk/psychology/ 
 
The order of authors is arbitrary 
 
Preprint of chapter published in: D. M. Walsh (Ed.), Naturalism, evolution and mind. (Royal 
Institute of Philosophy Supplement 49.) (pp. 239-266). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
 
 
Domains, Brains and Evolution 
 2 
Abstract 
Our aim in this paper is to do some conceptual spring-cleaning. Several prominent evolutionary 
psychologists have argued that the human cognitive architecture consists in a large number of 
domain-specific features, rather than, as dissenters claim, a small number of domain-general 
features. The first difficulty here is that there exists no widely agreed-upon definition of ‘domain’. 
We show that evolutionary psychology has the resources for such a definition: a domain is defined 
as an adaptive problem, or a set of suitably related adaptive problems. Adopting this definition, we 
proceed to introduce the distinction between data and algorithms, and to differentiate four 
conceptions of our cognitive architecture, only two of which, we argue, are viable: (a) general-
purpose mechanisms operating on domain-specific information, and (b) special-purpose 
mechanisms operating on domain-specific information. Typically, evolutionary psychologists argue 
in favour of (b), as against (a). Following a defence of this position against a recent claim that the 
process of exaptation makes general-purpose mechanisms evolutionarily plausible, we consider the 
strongest of the evolutionary psychologists’ in-principle arguments for the evolutionary 
implausibility of general-purpose mechanisms. This argument is based on two requirements: that 
the human cognitive architecture must (i) be capable of solving all the adaptive problems faced by 
our ancestors, and (ii) have outperformed all competing designs. Work in artificial intelligence 
suggests that although requirement (i) might be met by general-purpose mechanisms coupled with 
domain-specific information, requirement (ii) won’t. Nonetheless, we propose (tentatively) that 
relatively general-purpose mechanisms might result from the operation of multiple, simultaneous, 
systematically related selection pressures. An examination of this proposal, however, brings into 
sharp relief the fact that, in many evolutionary scenarios, it simply may not be possible to establish 
a robust distinction between domain-specific and domain-general features. 
